Among all physiological signals, electrocardiogram (ECG) has seen some of the largest expansion in both medical and recreational applications with the rise of single-lead versions. These versions are embedded in medical devices and wearable products such as the Having clinicians analyzing such a large number of ECGs is impractical. Recently, driven by the introduction of deep learning methodologies, automation systems have been developed, allowing rapid and accurate ECG classification [7] . In the 2017 PhysioNet Challenge for atrial fibrillation classification using single-lead ECG, multiple efficient solutions utilized deep neural networks [8] . However, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial examples in general [19, 5] and very recently in medical applications [3] . Therefore, it is unknown if deep learning algorithms are robust in ECG classification.
0.87 for the ECG classes (Normal, AF and Other) on the test set, comparable to state of the art ECG classification systems [6] . Figure 1 : Typical examples for disruptive adversarials. We add fine smooth perturbations (black signal) to the original tracings (purple signal) to create adversarial examples. Perturbation and tracing voltage are plotted at the same scale. The neural network correctly diagnose normal sinus rhythm and AF with 99% and 100% confidence when the original tracings are used. However, when presented with adversarial examples indistinguishable to expert clinician, the neural network missclasifies normal sinus rhythm to AF and AF to normal sinus with 100% confidence.
Original tracing
Adversarial Examples. Adversarial examples are intentionally designed by humans to cause a machine learning algorithm to make a mistake. These examples are made by adding a small human-imperceptible perturbation to the inputs of the machine learning algorithm [5, 19] . These kinds of adversarial examples have been successfully created in the field of medical imaging classification [4] . Traditional adversarial attack algorithms add a small imperceptible perturbation to lower the prediction accuracy of a machine learning model. However, attacking ECG deep learning classifiers with traditional methods creates examples that display square wave artifacts that are not physiologically plausible (Extended Data fig. 5 Figure 2 : Network accuracy on our generated adversarial examples. We were able to generate adversarial examples, leading to missclasification in 74% of ECG tracings. We asked clinicians to determine whether 250 pairs of adversarial examples and original ECGs come from the same class. On average, they concluded that 246.5/250 pairs belonged to the same class, confirming that the examples did not substantially modify the data set. Hence, the deep network failed to correctly classify most of the newly generated examples, despite their almost complete similarity (98.6%) to the human reader.
We generate adversarial examples on the test set. We transform the test examples to make the network change the label of Normal, Other and Noise to any other label. For AF, we alter the AF test examples so that the deep neural network classifies them Normal. Misdiagnosis of AF as Normal increases the risk of AF related complications such as stroke and heart failure. We showcase the generation of adversarial examples in Figure 1 . Figure 3 : Clinician success rate of distinguishing real ECG's from adversarial examples. We asked clinicians expert in ECG reading to distinguish between 100 pairs of original ECGs and adversarial examples generated by the traditional attack method. They could correctly identify 95% of the adversarial examples on average. We than asked them to distinguish between 100 pairs of original ECGs and adversarial examples generated by our smooth attack method. This resulted in correct identification of only 62% of examples.
After adversarial attacks, 74% of the test ECGs originally classified correctly by the network are now assigned a different diagnosis. This shows deep ECG classifiers are very vulnerable to adversarial examples. We invited one board certified medicine specialist and one cardiac electrophysiology specialist. We asked them to diagnose whether signals generated by our methods and original ECGs come from the same class. From Figure 2 , the model wrongly diagnosed almost all (98.6%) of the signals created by our method.
We also invited the clinical specialists to distinguish ECG signals from the adversarial examples generated by our smooth method and the traditional attack method [14] . From Figure 3 , the adversarial examples generated by our method are much harder for clinicians to distinguish from the original ECG than the traditional attack method.
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Existence of adversarial examples. If adversarial examples are rare, they become important only through malicious actors who try to create them. Here we provide a construction that shows that such examples are not rare. To generate more examples, we add small Gaussian noise to the adversarial examples and smooth them. We repeat this process 1000 times and find that the deep neural network still incorrectly classifies all 1000 new examples, i.e, they are adversarial examples. Resampling produced adversarial examples on 87.6% of the test examples from which adversarial examples were generated. We plot all of the newly crafted adversarial examples which form a band around the original ECG signal in Figure 4 .
The signals in the band may intersect. We choose pairs of intersecting signals and concatenate the left half of one signal with right half of the other to create a new example. We find that signals created by concatenation are also adversarial examples. We also sample random value in the band for each time step and then smooth it to create new adversarial examples. These findings emphasize that smooth signals in the entire band are adversarial examples; they are not rare. (See Methods section for detailed description.) Discussion. We demonstrated the ability to disrupt a deep neural network with human-indistinguishable adversarial ECG examples, resulting in incorrect classification. Moreover, we show that such examples are not rare. These findings raise several questions regarding the use of deep learning in analyzing ECGs. First, classification methods for ECGs, especially those that operate without humans, need to generalize. To minimize sensitivity to adversarial examples, deep learning approaches would need training data from a very wide range of subjects, significantly greater than the size of data-set required for the purpose of class-training. Moreover, data acquired in multiple environments would be required to ensure safe generalization. The need for these immense training data also requires impractical human effort, as clinical experts would be required to provide correct labels. This process of collecting training data and labeling would need to be carried out for each new device. Second, malicious actors could inject small, indistinguishable perturbations to real-world data. This could represent an important vulnerability, with implications such as attacking medical devices relying on ECG interpretation (pacemakers, defibrillators), introducing intentional bias into clinical trials, and skewing data to alter insurance claims.
One way to protect against adversarial examples is to train with them. Such an approach can only protect against known adversarial examples. Here, we demonstrate a method to generate adversarial examples for ECG classification. However, there may be many other ways to generate adversarial examples for ECGs, so protecting by training with a specific set of examples could be insufficient. A more direct approach would be to certify with mathematical proofs the deep neural networks for robustness [18] as suggested for other safety-critical domains like aviation [10] .
The lack of robustness is not inherent to the use of statistical methods to classify ECGs. Humans tend to be more robust to small perturbations because they use more coarse features to classify ECGs like the R-R interval or the P-wave morphology. Coarser features change less under small perturbations and generalize better to new domains. These coarser features, very often, have underlying biophysical meanings. To automate the classification of less prevalent ECG diagnoses, it may be useful to incorporate known electrocardiographic markers of biophysical phenomena along with deep learning, even on the account of network accuracy.
Finally, algorithms should model their confidence about predictions they make, so as to be able to defer to humans when uncertain. 
Methods
Description of the Traditional Attack Methods. Two traditional attack methods are fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [5] and projected gradient descent (PGD) [13] . They are white-box attack methods based on the gradients of the loss with respect to the input.
Denote our input entry x, true label y, classifier (network) f , and loss function L( f (x), y). We describe FGSM and PGD below:
• Fast gradient sign method (FGSM). FGSM is a fast algorithm. For an attack level ε, FGSM sets
The attack level is chosen to be sufficiently small so as to be undetectable.
• Projected gradient descent (PGD). An improved version is to use an iterative version of FGSM. Define C lip x,ε (x ) to project each x back to the infinite norm ball by clamping the maximum absolute difference value between x and x to ε. Beginning by setting x 0 = x, we have
After T steps, we get our adversarial example x adv = x T .
Our Smooth Attack Method. In order to smooth the signal, we use the help of convolution. By convolution, we take the weighted average of one position of the signal and its neighbors:
where a is the objective function and v is the weights or kernel function. In our experiment, the weights are determined by a Gaussian kernel. Mathematically, if we have a Gaussian kernel of size 2K+1 and standard deviation σ, we have
.
We can easily see that when σ goes to infinity, the convolution with Gaussian kernel becomes a simple average; when σ goes to zero, the convolution becomes an identity function. Instead of getting an adversarial perturbation and then convolving it with the Gaussian kernels, we could create adversarial examples by optimizing a smooth perturbation that fools the neural network. We introduce our method of training smooth adversarial perturbations (SAP). In our SAP method, we take the adversarial perturbation as the parameter θ and add it to the clean examples after convolving with a number of Gaussian kernels. We denote K(s, σ) to be a Gaussian kernel with size s and standard deviation σ. The resulting adversarial example could be written as a function of θ :
In our experiment, we let s be {5, 7, 11, 15, 19} and σ be {1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 7.0, 10.0}. Then we try to maximize the loss function with respect to θ to get the adversarial example. We still use PGD but on θ this time:
There are two major differences between updates (2) and (1). In (2), we update θ not x adv and clip around zero not the input x. In practice, we initialize the adversarial perturbation θ to be the one obtained from PGD (ε = 10, α = 1, T = 20) on x and run another PGD (ε = 10, α = 1, T = 40) on θ .
Existence of Adversarial Examples
We design experiments to show that adversarial examples are not rare. Denote original signal to be x and adversarial example we generated to be x adv . First, we generate Gaussian noise δ ∼ (0, 25) and then add it to the adversarial examples. To make sure the new examples are still smooth, we smooth the perturbation by convolving with the same Gaussian kernels in our smooth attack method. We then clip the perturbation to make sure that it is still in the infinite norm ball. The newly generated example is
We repeat the process of generating new examples 1000 times. [t] to be the maximum value and minimum value of 1000 samples at time step t. To sample a smooth signal from the band, we first sample a uniform random variable a[t] ∼ (min[t], max[t]) for each time step t and then we smooth the perturbation. The example generated by uniform sampling and smoothing, this time is
We repeat this procedure 1000 times, and all the newly generated examples still cause the network to make the wrong diagnosis.
Extended Data
Original ECG Adversarial Example Figure 5 : Adversarial Examples Created by PGD method. This adversarial example contains square waves and is not smooth. A physician reading this tracing will likely detect that this adversarial example is not a real ECG.
